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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A)

NATURE OF THE CASE

This appeal is an attempt by Appellant to overturn a district court judge's decision and a
valid jury verdict without providing this Court with the necessary factual basis by which to
challenge these decisions. Appellant then attempts to address the lack of a factual foundation on
appeal by requesting that this Court's order denying Appellant's request for waiver of the fee for the
trial transcript based upon the district court's recommendation be reconsidered.
This Court's order regarding Appellant's application for fee waiver was the correct decision
based upon the district court's recommendation and Appellant's lack of explanation addressing the
concerns stated by the district court in its oral ruling.
Without a transcript of the trial, Appellant should not be allowed to make any claims
regarding the facts at trial because statements of attorneys are not evidence and the Idaho Appellate
Rules require all factual representations to have citations to the record. Appellant's appeal should
be dismissed due to a lack of a transcript of the trial.

If this Court accepts Appellant's appeal despite the absence of the trial transcript, then
Appellant should not prevail as he has failed to show that the jury verdict or the district court's
decision on the post-trial motions should be altered by this Court.
B)

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

The Complaint in this action was filed on March 27, 2006. R, p. 12. Defendants filed their
Answer and Demand for Jury Trial on July 12, 2006. R, p. 17.
The Complaint alleged that on April 4, 2004, Defendant, Kristen Seamons Drzayich,
negligently operated a vehicle which caused a vehicle accident with Plaintiffs vehicle. R, pp. 13RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 1

14. The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was injured as a result of the accident. R, pp. 14-15.
After a lengthy procedural history that included the trial being postponed a number of times,
the trial took place on September 27, 2010 through October 6, 2010. R, pp. 2-8.
After answering a special verdict form, the jury returned a verdict finding that Defendant
Kristen Seamons Drzayich was negligent and that the negligence proximately caused damages to
Plaintiff. R, pp. 252-254. The Special Verdict awarded Plaintiff $4,100 in economic damages and
zero in non-economic damages. R, pp. 254.
Following the trial the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict to
Alter or Amend Judgment or for New Trial or Addit:ur on November 5, 2010. R. p. 261. Defendant
responded by filing Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Post Trial Motions and the Fifth Affidavit
of Ryan B. Peck (Objection to Plaintiff's Post Trial Motions, December 7. 2010 at 1, and Fifth
Affidavit of Ryan B. Peck, December 8, 2010, at 1.)
Following a hearing, the district court issued its order denying Plaintiff's post trial motions
on January 10, 2011. R. p. 334.
The district court issued the Final Judgment on February 7, 2011, awarding Plaintiff the
amount of $42.25 after offsetting the jury verdict amount with the award of costs to Defendant. R.
pp. 344-345.
Plaintiff filed the Notice of Appeal on February 9, 2011. R. p. 347. Plaintiff also filed a
motion to waive fees and costs on appeal in the district court. Plaintiff's motion was heard on
March 14, 2011.

(Appellant's Verified Motion for Waiver of Costs, Exhibit E, Rep01ter's

Transcript of Excerpt of Motion for Fee Waiver at 1.) The district court issued a recommendation
to this Court that Plaintiff's motion for waiver of fees and costs be denied. Id. at 6. This Court
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issued its Order Denying Motion for Waiver of Costs on May 16, 2011.
Plaintiff filed the Appellant's Opening Brief on September 12, 2011.
C)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Due to the fact that Appellant has failed to provide a trial transcript, the record on appeal is

devoid of useful evidence presented during the trial of this matter. The trial exhibits are a part of the
record on appeal, however, without the trial testimony regarding these exhibits they are of limited
usefulness to this Court. The exhibits may have been supported or discounted by the testimony
relating to the exhibits.

Respondent is therefore hesitant to provide any statement of facts as

Respondent will also not be able to cite to the trial transcript. Any statement regarding the trial facts
will not be supported by the transcript record on appeal.
In order to respond to Appellant's unsupported factual arguments, Respondent hereby

provides this Court with the statement of facts Respondent provided to the district court when the
district court heard these issues. In its order the district court stated, "For efficiency purposes this
Court adopts Defendant's [Respondent's] analysis of the evidence as if set forth specifically herein."
R, p. 335. The following facts are the same facts as provided by Respondent to the district court in
relation to Appellant's post trial motion that were adopted by the district court. (Objection to
Plaintiff's Post Trial Motions, December 7, 2010 at 1-7.)
The undisputed facts were that Defendant and Plaintiff were involved in an accident. The
accident involved the front of Defendant's vehicle impacting Plaintiff's vehicle on the rear driver's
side of the vehicle. Shortly after the accident, both vehicles drove to a nearby parking area. The
police were called and an officer responded. The officer questioned all parties and did not issue any
citations. Other than these basic facts, almost all other facts were in dispute in regard to accuracy
and degree.
The medical testimony was lengthy and somewhat convoluted. Plaintiff attributed
numerous symptoms and injuries to the 2004 accident. Different specialized experts testified about
different alleged injuries and symptoms. None of Plaintiff's experts that testified at trial had
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reviewed Plaintiffs comprehensive medical history. Most of these experts became uncomfortable
with their own opinions when faced with even a part of Plaintiff's past medical history. All of
Plaintiff's experts ended up testifying the same way. Each of Plaintiffs testifying experts stated
their opinions were based upon Plaintiff's self-reported symptoms and self-reported onset of
symptoms.
This was emphasized by Plaintiff's expert, Dr. Smith. Dr. Smith was touted by Plaintiff to
be the most qualified of the experts due to his status as a neuro-surgeon. Dr. Smith stated regarding
causation, "I think the jury has to decide where the most credible onset of symptoms is." (Affidavit
of Ryan B. Peck, Exhibit A at 20.) Throughout trial it was emphasized by the medical experts that
the credibility of Plaintiff was paramount in making a determination regarding causation of the
alleged injuries.
The evidence at trial showed that almost all of the symptoms Plaintiff was alleging were
caused by the accident had been reported by Plaintiff to medical providers prior to the accident.
These previously existing symptoms include tinnitus, hyperacusis, back pain, neck pain, pain in the
extremities, voice breaks, tremors, headaches, dizziness, blacking out and memory loss. The
evidence at trial also showed that Plaintiff did not complain of the worsening of many of these preexisting symptoms until months after the accident.
Defendant testified that the accident was very minor. Defendant stated that she had almost
come to a stop prior to impacting Plaintiff and that the van was only moved a couple of feet due to
the impact. The photographs of the Plaintiff's vehicle showed mild damage to the fender of the
vehicle and possible damage to the wheel and other parts connected to the wheel.
Defendant testified that Plaintiff was not in any visible distress immediately following the
accident and complained of no injury or pain. Defendant testified that Plaintiff acted normally and
even retrieved a phone book and newspaper from his van. The testimony was that the police officer
arrived 15-30 minutes after the accident. The police officer testified that everyone reported to him
that there were no injuries due to the accident. The police officer stated that no one reported to him
that they were in pain as a result of the accident.
The evidence showed that Plaintiff had a long history of back and neck pain due to arthritis
and prior accidents. The evidence showed that Plaintiff had been to the chiropractor the day before
the accident for treatment for back pain. The day following the accident the Plaintiff returned to the
chiropractor complaining of back pain. The Plaintiff self-reported that his back pain, including his
neck, had increased due to the accident.
Plaintiff's expert neuro-psychologist testified that Plaintiff's symptoms could be partially
due to psychological concerns. He also testified that his assessment did not include several of the
pre-existing medical records and that Plaintiff refused to do certain testing that would have shown
what tendencies Plaintiff had to make up or exaggerate symptoms. Dr. Greenwald also stated that
in her opinion Plaintiff's reported symptoms were largely psychological and not related to actual
injury from the 2004 accident.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 4

The evidence at trial showed that Plaintiff incurred injuries after the 2004 accident. Plaintiff
was taken to the hospital after overworking himself approximately four months after the 2004
accident. Plaintiff complained of severe left-sided chest and arm pain. It was reported by Plaintiffs
wife and others that following this injury, Plaintiff began to experience pain, left-sided weakness,
headaches, and facial droopiness.
MRI's taken approximately a year after the accident indicated that Plaintiff had suffered
some type of injury to his back at some point after and unrelated to the 2004 accident. When a<;ked,
Plaintiff stated he could not remember what happened.
The evidence at trial demonstrated that Plaintiff was not credible. The medical records
indicated that Plaintiff changed his story regarding the onset of his symptoms. Plaintiff also
withheld important medical information from his medical providers. The evidence was that
Plaintiff manipulated his medical data to obtain the causation opinions he wanted. Evidence was
presented that Plaintiff was attempting to get money for injuries and conditions unrelated to the
accident.
Evidence was presented showing that Plaintiff was being untruthful in regard to his
employment. Plaintiff testified more than once under oath that he could no longer work full-time
because of his injuries. A video of a television interview in 2010 of Plaintiff was discovered where
Plaintiff stated that he worked more than full-time. It was also discovered that following the
accident, Plaintiff expanded his newspaper into neighboring states, expanded his website and
continued to participate in singing and counseling.
Medical testimony was presented that a brain injury and its symptoms could not be turned
on and off at will. Plaintiff claimed lack of many mental abilities due to brain injury. Plaintiff
testified under oath that he had tremors, poor speech, fluency problems and memory difficulties.
The Plaintiff also testified that his left arm movement was restricted. Plaintiff attempted to show
these symptoms at trial during his testimony. Plaintiff stuttered responses to questions, frequently
trembled, stated a lack of memory, appeared to have trouble hearing and understanding questions,
bunched up his shoulders, leaned to the left, practically whispered his responses and winced often.
Plaintiff claimed these were constant and ongoing symptoms from the accident.
In the television interview shown to the jury, Plaintiff was fluent, energetic, responsive and
expressive. Plaintiff had no problem following the rapid and varied conversation. Plaintiff
responded to questions quickly, appropriately and without any weakness of voice. Plaintiff did not
tremble or shake. Plaintiff did not have any problems moving his left arm and did not wince.
Plaintiff did not squint his eyes or have any apparent hearing difficulties.
Following the video, Plaintiff's demeanor changed during his examination. Plaintiff
stopped shaking and using a weak voice. Plaintiff did not seem to have any further problems with
understanding the questions. Plaintiff did not act weak or favor his left side.
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The video and Plaintiff's change in demeanor showed that Plaintiff was feigning symptoms
for the benefit of the jury. The video also showed that Plaintiff was not being truthful when he
ex plained his symptoms existed from the time of the 2004 accident to the present day.
Dr. Ferch was the only one of Plaintiffs medical providers that testified as to a specific
amount of medical expenses incurred by Plaintiff for injuries caused by the 2004 accident or for
future care. Dr. Ferch admitted in cross-examination that his figures did not include treatment
needed for pre-existing injuries or from the other accidents. The only evidence regarding specific
damages for prior medical care was a breakdown of medical expenses from Blue Cross. The only
evidence regarding specific damages for future care was a breakdown prepared by Plaintiff. In this
breakdown, Plaintiff was seeking over $80,000 for tear drops.
During the trial several objections by both sides were heard and ruled upon by the court. At
different times during the trial, Plaintiff attempted to introduce a letter from Dr. Katz, a neuroopthamologist, and a letter from Dr. Beaver, the neuro-psychologist. Dr. Beaver testified in person
at trial and Dr. Katz testified via the reading of his deposition. The times when Plaintiff moved for
the admission of the two letters from Dr. Katz and Dr. Beaver, Defendant objected to the
introduction of the letters. Defendant argued that the letters had not been identified as exhibits per
the court's pre-trial order. Defendant did admit that both letters had been produced in discovery, but
were simply not identified as exhibits. At both times Plaintiff attempted to get the letters admitted,
the court ruled the same way. The court ruled that the documents were heresay (sic) and that no
foundation had been laid for an exception to the heresay rule (sic). On that premise the court ruled
the letters inadmissible. The court also stated that in the event adequate foundation was presented,
the court would not admit evidence that violated the court's pre-trial order. In both cases, Plaintiff
did not attempt to lay additional foundation nor did he attempt to re-introduce the letters.
In closing argument, Plaintiff's counsel failed to specifically request damages based upon
pain and suffering or other non-economic damages. Plaintiff was simply requesting payment for
medical bills and future medical care. Because Plaintiff's counsel did not mention non-economic
damages in closing, Defendant's counsel did not argue that issue.
Defendant did not attempt to make opening, interim, or closing arguments regarding
Plaintiff's religion or on his beliefs regarding homosexuality or abortion. The jury did not appear to
be moved by passion or prejudice due to the statements made by Plaintiff in the video interview or
regarding the license revocation. The jury did return a verdict based upon the evidence and the
credibility of the witnesses.
Id. Again, this recitation of the facts is not offered as an adequate substitute to the trial transcript,

but only to allow the Court to have a record of the disputed nature of the facts of this case and to
provide the basis for the arguments below.
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II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
A)

Whether this Court Should Affirm its Denial of Appellant's Verified Motion for

Waiver of Costs?
B)

Whether Appellant's Appeal Should be Dismissed for Failure of Appellant to Submit

the Trial Transcript?
C)

Whether the District Court's Post Trial and Evidentiary Rulings Should be Affirmed

on Appeal?
1.

Whether This Court Should Affirm the District Court's Ruling Denying Appellant's

Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict?
2.

Whether This Court Should Affirm the District Court's Ruling Denying Appellant's

Motion for a New Trial?
3.

Whether This Court Should Affirm the District Court's Evidentiary Rulings at Trial?

4.

Whether This Court Should Affirm the District Court's Ruling Denying Appellant's

Request for an Additur?

D)

Whether the Respondent is Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees on Appeal?

III. ARGUMENT
This brief and the evidence in the record show that this Court should (A) affirm its decision
to deny Appellant's motion for waiver of costs; (B) dismiss this appeal for failure of the Appellant
to provide a trial transcript; and (C) affirm the district court's evidentiary and post trial rulings.

A)

THIS COURT'S ORDER DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR WAIVER
OF COSTS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED
This Court acted properly in denying Appellant's request for waiver of costs due to the

failure of Appellant to address the concerns set forth in the district court's order recommending that
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this Court deny the application for fee waiver.
Appellant's motion for waiver of costs was made pursuant to JAR 23 and I.C. § 31-3220.
The decision to deny an application for waiver of fees is discretionary with the district court.

Johnson v. Jones, 105 Idaho 602, 671 P.2d 1065 (1983). The Idaho Supreme Court has stated,

'·rn a

matter of this type, we assign substantial weight to the trial court's discretion and to its exercise of
that discretion. Johnson, 105 Idaho at 603,671 P.2d at 1066.
The district court in this matter recommended denial of Appellant's application for fee
waiver based heavily upon Appellant's apparent choice not to earn the money to pay for the costs
on appeal. The district court stated, "He [Appellant] appears to be underemployed." (Appellant's
Verified Motion for Waiver of Costs, Exhibit E, Reporter's Transcript of Excerpt of Motion for Fee
Waiver at 3, 1. 23.) The district court after discussing Appellant's choice to counsel for little or no
money stated, "But running a publishing business that can't make money doesn't make sense,
particularly where this is so important." Id. at 4, 1. 7-10. The district court then made its point
stating, "He could get a job on the weekends working an (sic) a C-store to get the money to pay his
costs and not have the taxpayers of the county pay it, it seems to me. Id. at 4, 1. 23-25 and p. 5, L 1.
The district court's assertion that Appellant is underemployed was never addressed by the
Appellant in further argument or in his application for waiver of costs to this Court. The Appellant
instead continues to assert that despite working two jobs he is losing money each month. Appellant
claims to only be making a gross amount of $895.00 per month. Id., Exhibit Bat 2. Based upon the
present day minimum wage, Appellant would make substantially more money being a Wal-Mart
greeter or working at a convenience store as suggested by the district court. It is clear that Appellant
could make sufficient money to pay for his court fees and costs.
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The relevant definition of indigent is one "who is found by the court to be unable to pay
fees, costs or giver security for the purpose of prepayment of fees, costs or security in a civil
action." LC. § 3 l-3220(1)(d) (2010) (Emphasis added). The definition of indigent in the statute
requires the court to find that a person is "unable" to pay. In this matter, the district court properly
indicated that it appears that Appellant is able to pay, but has chosen to be underemployed. The
taxpayers should not have to pay for Appellant's choice to engage in pursuits that do not provide an
income.
The district court also noted that Appellant had access to his spouse's income. (Appellant's
Verified Motion for Waiver of Costs, Exhibit E, Reporter's Transcript of Excerpt of Motion for Fee
Waiver at 5, 11. 14-24.) In response Appellant has simply maintained the argument that Appellant's
wife's income should not be considered because she is not a party to the lawsuit. The district court
rightly pointed out that whether Appellant's wife is a party to the lawsuit is irrelevant to whether
Appellant has access to his wife's income. Id. Appellant has not supplied an adequate reason why
his wife's income could not be used to pay for the costs or to use to borrow money to pay for the
costs.
Having failed to address the concerns raised by the district court, Appellant has provided
this Court with no adequate reason for this Court to give deference to the district court's
recommendation to deny Appellant's motion to waive costs on appeal. This Court should affirm its
decision denying Appellant's motion to waive costs.

B)

APPELLANT'S APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF A TRIAL
TRANSCRIPT
All of Appellant's arguments on appeal rely upon the record created at the trial of this

matter. Appellant's claims are questioning the factual findings by the jury and the judge based upon
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the evidence and testimony presented at the trial. Appellant supports his arguments by referencing
facts that he claims were established during the trial. Idaho Appellate Rule 35(6) requires the
Appellant to include an "Argument" section in the brief which, "shall contain the contentions of the
appellant with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to the
authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record relied upon." (Emphasis added).
The Idaho Court of Appeals has stated that, "we are unable to consider any issues cited on
appeal not supported by propositions of law, authority or argument." Interlode Constructors, Inc. v.
Bryant, 132 Idaho 443,447, 974 P.2d 89, 93 (Ct.App. 1999). The Supreme Court has recently held:
I.AR. 35(a)(6), which governs the contents of appellate briefs, requires that [t]he argument
... contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the
reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record relied
upon. This Court has held that issues on appeal that are not supported by propositions of law or
authority are deemed waived and will not be considered. Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. of Health Welfare,
147 Idaho 257, 266, 207 P.3d 988, 997 (2009).

Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho 224, 230, 220 P.3d 580, 586 (2009). More specifically in Michalk,

the Supreme Court held that one of the litigants "failed entirely to support her argument with
citations to any evidence in the record or relevant legal authority." Id. Based upon the party's
omission of citations to evidence the Supreme Court declined to review the argument. Id.
The present case is similar to Michalk, in that Appellant has failed to support many of his
factual assertions with citations to the record. The Appellant has failed to provide the trial transcript
and so the factual assertions made by Appellant are not supported in the record. Appellant attempts
to cite to exhibits at times in his brief, but without the benefit of the trial transcript the exhibits are
not complete and are not properly cited as evidence.
For example, Appellant cites to Appellant's Trial Exhibit 5 and 5A to support his claim that
Appellant had significant future medical expenses as a result of the accident. (Appellant's Opening
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Brief at 19.) Appellant, however, fails to cite to the trial transcript to show where the content of
these exhibits were supported by the medical experts at trial. Further, Appellant cannot demonstrate
that there was not contrary evidence presented that would allow a jury to reason that the medical
expenses listed were unrelated to the subject accident.
It is apparent that Appellant understood the necessity to introduce evidence of the trial
testimony, because Appellant includes several assertions in his brief regarding the testimony that
was presented at trial. Appellant, however, does not support these assertions with the actual trial
transcript. Appellant's failure to supply the trial transcript in this matter makes it impossible for
Appellant to comply with IAR 35(a)(6) requiring that appellate briefs contain citations to the record
to support the arguments in the brief. By failing to supply the trial transcript, Appellant has waived
any issues regarding the trial proceedings or outcome. See: Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho 224, 220
P.3d 580 (2009); Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. of Health Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, 207 P.3d 988 (2009);

Interlode Constructors, Inc. v. Bryant, 132 Idaho 443, 974 P.2d 89 (Ct.App. 1999).
Respondent therefore requests that this Court dismiss Appellant's appeal in this matter.
Should this Court choose to consider Appellant's claims despite a lack of the trial transcript,
Respondent respectfully submits the following arguments regarding Appellant's claims.

C)

THE DISTRICT COURT'S TRIAL AND POST TRIAL RULINGS SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED
This Court should affirm the district court's rulings denying Appellant's request for

judgment notwithstanding the verdict, motion for new trial, motion to alter or amend judgment and
motion for additur. This Court should uphold the district court's evidentiary rulings. The law and
facts adopted by the district court show that the jury's verdict should be upheld in its entirety and
enforced in this case.
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1. Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict

a. Standard of Review
The Supreme Court has held that, "a j.n.o.v. is simply a delayed motion for a directed
verdict. I.R.C.P. 50(b); Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 763, 727 P.2d 1187, 1191 (1986)."
Dabestani v. Bellus, 131 Idaho 542, 544, 961 P.2d 633,635 (1998). The Supreme Court also

articulated the following standards for making a decision on a j.n.o.v.:
A party moving for j.n.o.v. must admit the truth of the other party's evidence and this
evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the other party. Id. In reviewing a
trial court's ruling on a motion for j.n.o. v., we must determine whether or not "there can be
but one conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable minds could have reached;" that is,
whether there is substantial and competent evidence justifying the verdict. Id. at 764, 727
P.2d at 1192.
Id. The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that, "Hence, the trial court is not free to weigh the

evidence or pass on the credibility of witnesses, making it own independent findings of fact and
comparing them to the jury's findings, as would be the case in deciding a motion for new trial."
Smith v. Praegitzer, 113 Idaho 887, 890, 749 P.2d 1012, 1015 (Ct.App. 1988).

The Supreme Court has held, "In determining whether a district court should have granted a
j.n.o.v. motion, this Court employs the same standard the district court used in ruling on the
motion." Coombs v. Curnow, 148 Idaho 129, 136, 219 P.3d 453,460 (2009).
b. Appellant's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict was Properly
Denied
The jury's verdict in this case is supported by the clear weight of the evidence especially
when considering all facts in favor of the Respondent. The jury's verdict complied with the facts
and with the law presented to them. Appellant has limited his arguments for JNOV to attacking the
amount of money the jury awarded for economic and non-economic damages. The law the jury
applied in reaching a decision on the amount of damages was found in the jury instructions. Jury
RESPONDENT'S BRIKF - 12

instructions number 1, 10, 16 and 18.
Jury instruction number 1 includes the phrase, "As the sole judges of the facts, you must
determine what evidence you believe and what weight you attach to it." Jury instruction number 10
states that Appellant has the burden of proof with regard to the elements of damages and the
amounts thereof.

This proposition is separate from the other propositions to be proved. Jury

instruction number 16 expands on 10 by stating, "the jury must determine the amount of money that
will reasonably and fairly compensate the plaintiff for any damages proved to be proximately
caused by the defendant's negligence." Jury instruction number 18 allows the jury to find that a
party has failed to properly mitigate their damages. These damages are not recoverable.
In the present case it is clear that the jury did not find Appellant to be credible. There was
substantial and convincing evidence showing that Appellant was deceptive, manipulative and faked
symptoms. (Objection to Plaintiff's Post Trial Motions, December 7, 2010 at 1-7.) Appellant was
shown to be faking symptoms at trial. Id.
As shown above in the facts adopted by the district court, both Respondent and the police
officer testified that Appellant was not exhibiting any symptoms of pain and suffering at the time of
the accident. Id.

Appellant is claiming that the evidence was uncontroverted at trial that he

sustained injury and was in pain following the accident. (Appellant's Opening Brief at 6 and 19.)
The evidence from the police officer and Respondent contradict Appellant's claim that he was
suffering pain following the subject vehicle accident.
The jury was provided with medical records showing Appellant changing his story with
regard to how the accident occurred and the effects of the accident. (Objection to Plaintiffs Post
Trial Motions, December 7, 2010 at 1-7.) The jury was shown medical evidence that Appellant
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withheld important information from his medical experts who evaluated and testified regarding his
injmies. Id. At trial, all of Appellant's medical experts admitted that their opinions relied upon
Appellant's credibility. Id. When shown where Appellant had withheld medical records, some of
Appellant's experts questioned their opinions and stated that the jury would have to rely upon the
credibility of the Appellant. Id.
There was substantial evidence showing Appellant had pre-existing mJur1es that
encompassed almost all of the symptoms he complained were caused by the accident. Id. It was
shown that the pain and symptoms from these pre-existing injuries was ongoing at the point of the
subject accident. Id. Appellant had even been to see the chiropractor the day before the accident
and had the same type of symptoms and treatments that were provided in the days following the
accident. Id.
There was important evidence provided to the jury that Appellant engaged in activities that
caused injury to Appellant following the 2004 accident.

Id.

It was shown that Appellant

overworked himself carrying newspapers and ended up in the emergency room. Id.
Later, MRI evidence along with expert testimony showed that Appellant was likely in a
subsequent accident that caused significant back injury. Id. Appellant did not deny having such an
accident, but simply stated he could not remember it. Id.
Medical evidence was shown to the jury establishing that Appellant was prone to
exaggerating symptoms and that he had psychological issues umelated to the accident that could be
responsible for his symptoms. Id.

The jury witnessed Appellant being a guest on a television

program. Id. The television program showed Appellant physically and mentally capable to perform
tasks he denied were possible for him.
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Viewing this evidence and all inferences in a light most favorable to the Defendant, this
evidence supports the jury's verdict. The jury awarded $4,100. This amount could comprise the
jury's estimate of the cost of diagnostic treatment that was reasonable and necessary following a
vehicle accident. This amount would cover a few initial consultations and scans shown to have
been accomplished in this matter. These diagnostic evaluations and scanning are common and
could be considered to be reasonable and necessary to establish whether the accident exacerbated or
caused any new injuries or symptoms. These tests and evaluations are commonplace in our society
and are separate from treatment designed to relieve pain and suffering. It is reasonable that any
person with significant pre-existing conditions should undergo these evaluations and scans
following a motor vehicle accident. whether or not the accident resulted in new injuries or additional
pain and suffering. The jury could have easily concluded that Appellant had failed to prove any
new injury or increase in pre-existing symptoms, but was entitled to have some of his diagnostic
exams and visits compensated. The amount the jury awarded could also include money for repairs
to Appellant's vehicle, which award would have nothing to do with pain and suffering.
There is no instruction or law that requires a jury to find that non-economic damages must
be found where economic damages are awarded. The Idaho Supreme Court upheld a verdict where
the jury found that the Defendant was negligent in supervision of Plaintiff, but awarded zero
damages. Hei v. Holzer, 145 Idaho 563, 181 P.3d 489 (2008). In Hei, Plaintiff, a high school
student, engaged in a consensual sexual relationship with a teacher. Id. Plaintiff testified to the
emotional distress that she related to the relationship. Id. Despite the jury finding that the school
had negligently supervised Plaintiff, the jury awarded no damages. Id. Both the trial court and the
Supreme Court found that, "numerous things were presented during the course of litigation that
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could have been the proximate cause of Hei's [Plaintiff's] emotional problems, other than the
negligent supervision of the school district." Id. at 569, 181 P.3d at 495. The Supreme Court
upheld the jury's verdict.
Similar to Hei, in the present matter there was conflicting evidence regarding every aspect
of Appellant's alleged damages. R., p. 336. While all the medical experts agreed that Appellant
may have experienced whiplash, none of them state that they were certain Appellant had
experienced whiplash. Also, no medical expert stated that Appellant would necessarily have pain
and suffering due to the whiplash. Substantial evidence was provided that Appellant experienced
no pain following the accident. (Objection to Plaintiff's Post Trial Motions, December 7, 2010 at 17.)

As stated above, both Respondent and the responding police officer stated that Appellant
was in no visible pain or discomfort following the accident. Both the Respondent and the police
officer testified that Appellant did not report being in any pain or discomfort following the accident.
The testimony from Respondent was that the Appellant was moving and doing activities that would
suggest that he did not injure himself in the accident. (Objection to Plaintiff's Post Trial Motions,
December 7, 2010 at 1-7.)
Evidence was presented that Appellant's claimed symptoms could be the result of
psychological issues umelated to the accident.

Id.

Substantial evidence was presented that

Appellant was already suffering the alleged symptoms prior to the subject accident. Id.

This

evidence supports the fact that Appellant may not have experienced any additional symptoms
caused by the subject accident. Respondent provided substantial and convincing evidence showing
that every medical complaint of Appellant either pre-existed the subject accident or was incurred in
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an unrelated accident or caused by an unrelated medical condition. Id.
Interestingly, Appellant failed to request a specific amount of money for non-economic
damages.

Id.

Appellant's counsel did not separate his requested damages into categories of

economic and non-economic damages. None of Appellant's experts testified to the value of noneconomic damages. The Appellant did not provide the jury with any expert testimony regarding the
value of Appellant's alleged non-economic damages. Id.
The jury's verdict is supported by substantial and competent evidence. Based upon the facts
adopted by the district court, this Court should affirm the district court's denial of Appellant's
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

2. Motion for New Trial
The Court of Appeals has held that, "A trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether
to grant or to deny a motion for a new trial." Smith v. Praegitzer, 113 Idaho 887, 890, 749 P.2d
1012, 1015 (Ct.App. 1988). The Supreme Court has held that, "We review orders denying motions
for new trial for an abuse of discretion." Schwan's Sales Enterprise, Inc. v. Idaho Transp. Dept.,
142 Idaho 826, 831, 136 P.3d 297, 302 (2006); citing: Pratton v. Gage, 122 Idaho 848, 850, 840
P.2d 392, 394 (1992).

a. Motion for New Trial Under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(S)
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5) a trial court, "must weigh
the evidence and then compare the jury's award to what he would have given had there been no
jury. If the disparity is so great that it appears to the trial court that the award was given under
influence of passion or prejudice, the verdict ought not stand." Harger v. Teton Springs Golf and
Casting, LLC, 145 Idaho 716, 718, 184 P.3d 841, 843 (2008); quoting: Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho
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620,625,603 P.2d 575,580 (1979).
The Supreme Court quoting Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 769, 727 P.2d 1187, 1197
(1986) held: "In other words, if the trial judge discovers that his determination of damages is so
substantially different from that of the jury that he can only explain this difference as resulting from
some unfair behavior, or what the law calls 'passion or prejudice,' on the part of the jury against one
or some of the parties, then he should grant a new trial." Harger, 145 Idaho at 718, 184 P.3d at 843.
The district court in its order on Appellant's motion for new trial properly stated the
standard of review and came to the following conclusion:
In ruling on Plaintiff's new trial and additur motions, under I.R.C.P. 59(a) and case

law, this Court does an independent review of the evidence which includes considering
witness credibility. The Court agrees with Defendant's objection to Plaintiff's motions.
This Court did not commit an error of law. The evidence supports the verdict of the jury.
However, the damages found by the jury verdict are more than this Court would have found.
At the conclusion of the closing arguments based upon Defendant's closing statement, this
Court thought that it may have given Plaintiff enough damages to go to the Doctor and
possibly have an MRI performed to be sure that Plaintiff did not suffer some injury in the
vehicle accident. The damages of $4,100.00 do not appear to have been given under the
influence of passion or prejudice. The Court was estimating approximately $1,200. The
difference between what the Court would have awarded and the jury award does not shock
the conscience of the Court.
R., p. 338.
The district court's reasoning is supported by the evidence at trial. Based upon the evidence
shown to the jury and the credibility of Appellant, the fact that the jury awarded Appellant anything
at all is the surest sign that they were not influenced by passion or prejudice. For the evidence
would have supported a zero verdict or a lesser verdict as the district court pointed out. Id. In spite
of the great weight of evidence showing that the Appellant was not credible, the jury still found that
Respondent was 100% liable and that Appellant had damages of $4,100. It is also apparent from
the fact that the verdict was originally $3,100 and then increased, that the jury took their
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calculations seriously and were not acting on passion or prejudice. The jury's decision was based
upon evidence and not passion.
Appellant argues that the jury was improperly influenced by the evidence of Plaintiff's
license revocation and by the interview wherein he mentioned negative views on homosexuality.
There was no indication that the jury was improperly influenced by either piece of evidence.
Certainly the evidence presented by the television interview impeached Appellant's statements and
behavior at trial, but this is completely proper. It seems the jury considered this evidence as relating
to Appellant's credibility. It is the jury's responsibility to weigh the credibility of witnesses.
Respondent requests that this Court affirm the district court's denial of Appellant's motion
for new trial pursuant to LRC.P. 59(a)(5).
b. Motion for New Trial under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6)

Appellant has not shown that there should be a new trial under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6). Appellant
makes essentially two motions under I.RC.P. 59(a)(6). First, Appellant argues that the jury's
responses to the special verdict form were inconsistent and thereby violate I.R.C.P. 59(a)(l) and (6).
The second motion is that there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict.
1. The Verdict was Consistent

Appellant did not timely raise the issue of inconsistent responses on a special verdict form
and in any event no such inconsistencies exist.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held: "The time for challenging a verdict as inconsistent is
when it is returned." Baldwin v. Ewing, 69 Idaho 176, 180, 204 P.2d 430, 432 (1949). The Idaho
Supreme Court has recently reiterated that standard in Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 879, 204
P.3d 508, 519 (2009).
Appellant failed to object to the verdict when it was returned by the jury. R, p. 335-336.
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Appellant has waived any right to object to the jury verdict as being inconsistent or irregular.
Appellant is barred from raising these issues.
In the event the Court considers Appellant's arguments, a review of the responses to the
special verdict form shows that they are not inconsistent. The verdict form reflects that the jury
found Respondent responsible for the accident and that the accident proximately caused the
damages it awarded. The jury then awarded only economic damages. Economic damages and noneconomic damages are split up on the verdict form. The jury can certainly find one without the
other and be consistent.
Appellant relies heavily upon the case of Tiegs v. Robertson, 149 Idaho 482, 236 P.3d 474,
478 (Ct.App. 2010) for his argument. The present case is decidedly different from Tiegs. In Tiegs,
the jury found that Defendant Robertson's negligence was not a proximate cause of Plaintiffs'
damages. The jury then went on to award Plaintiffs damages against Defendant Robertson. The
Idaho Court of Appeal held that these two responses were by legal definition inconsistent. Id.
In the present case, the jury's responses to the question of liability do not conflict with the

award of damages. Unlike in Tiegs, Appellant is arguing that the award of one type of damages is
inconsistent with failing to award another type of damages. This is not a legal or definitional
inconsistency.
Appellant has failed to timely raise the argument that the verdict is inconsistent and has
failed to show that the responses in the jury verdict in this case were inconsistent.

2. There was Sufficient Evidence to Support the Verdict
The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that, "In considering a motion for new trial on the
grounds of insufficient evidence under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6), the trial court is required to undertake a
two-part analysis. First, the court must consider whether the verdict was against the weight of the
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evidence and if the ends of justice would be served by vacating the verdict. The court then must
consider whether a different result would follow in a retrial." Litchfield v. Nelson, 122 Idaho 416,
422, 835 P.2d 651, 657 (Ct.App. 1992).
The Supreme Court has given additional guidance on the inquiry holding that:

It is axiomatic that a factual determination made by a jury will not be overturned if it
is sustained by the evidence. This is particularly true in tort actions where the damages
cannot be ascertained with mathematical precision. Hence, where such injuries are
subjective and measurable with only an approximation of certainty, their award is primarily
a question for the jury and an appellate court should interfere with such a verdict only in the
most exceptional circumstances.
Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 879, 204 P.3d 508, 519 (2009). The jury returned a verdict in this

case which included zero non-economic damages. As stated above, there is no law stating that a
jury must find non-economic damages if the jury finds economic damages. There are many types of
economic damages that do not involve pain and suffering.

The Supreme Court in Cramer,

acknowledges this by stating, "it is permissible for a jury to find that the Plaintiff failed to meet the
burden of providing non-economic damages, ... " Id. at 882,204 P.3d at 521.
Appellant relies almost exclusively on Cramer in making his argument. The present case is
importantly dissimilar from Cramer. In Cramer, the jury found Defendants as being liable for
negligent infliction of emotional distress upon the Plaintiff. The jury then did not give any damages
for emotional distress. The Court in Cramer was rightly concerned that the jury apparently found
that while Plaintiff had inflicted emotional distress upon Defendant, Defendant had not suffered
any. Despite this apparent inconsistency in ruling that a new trial should have been granted, the
Supreme Court did not rely upon the inconsistency, but relied upon the fact that, "the emotional
distress and any non-economic damages stemming from the emotional distress were uncontested."
Id.
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In the present case all aspects of Appellant's claimed damages were contested by

Respondent. The district court that witnessed the evidence at trial agreed, stating:
The Plaintiff claims it was uncontroverted that he was injured in the motor vehicle
accident at issue and that he suffered resulting pain. The Court disagrees that it was
uncontroverted. The whole jury trial was about how subjective the Plaintiff's reports of
pain, symptoms and causation were to the medical providers. As the Court commented in
open court, based upon the Plaintiff's demeanor in court during the jury trial, his behavior
with providing some but not all medical documents to various health providers, the
testimony of his wife and friends describing Plaintiffs demeanor before and after the
accident, when compared to his voice, energy, movements, recall, ability to concentrate,
answer complex questions, and his inconsistent statements about the hours he works during
his interview with the Christian television program, the jury could have reasonably assessed
the Plaintiff with zero credibility with regard to pain, symptoms and causation that he
reported to the health care providers. Significant evidence was presented showing that
Plaintiff was not credible in reporting his injuries or damages. Evidence was presented
establishing that Plaintiff had injuries unrelated to the accident that could have been
responsible for all his symptoms following the accident. Based upon the evidence presented
the jury could have found that Plaintiff was not injured at all in the subject accident. The
jury's verdict is supported by the evidence they received at trial.
R. p. 336.

Finally, it is apparent from the evidence that a new trial would not produce a different result
from the present jury's decision.
Based upon the facts as adopted by the district court, this Court should affirm the district
court's denial of Appellant's motion for new trial under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6).

3. The District Court Made Proper Evidentiary Rulings
The district court properly excluded hearsay documents and properly allowed impeachment
evidence to be introduced.
The Supreme Court has held that:
'This Court reviews challenges to a trial court's evidentiary rulings under the abuse
of discretion standard.' Perry v. Magic Valley Reg'[ Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 50, 995 P.2d
816, 820 (2000). These include challenges to a trial court's decision to admit or exclude
documentary and/or testimonial evidence. 'Error is disregarded unless the ruling is a
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manifest abuse of the trial court's discretion and affects a substantial right of the party.' Id.
at 51, 995 P.2d at 821.
Vreeken v. Lockwood Engineering, B. V., 148 Idaho 89, 106, 218 P.3d 1150, 1167 (2009).

It should be noted again that Appellant's failure to provide a trial transcript makes it
impossible for this Court to properly analyze the trial court's evidentiary rulings. By failing to
provide the evidence necessary for this Court to weigh the trial court's decisions, Appellant's
challenge should be denied.

a. The Trial Court Properly Excluded Hearsay Evidence
Appellant attempted to introduce letters from various doctors. One letter was from Dr.
Beaver and one was from Dr. Katz. (Objection to Plaintiff's Post Trial Motions, December 7, 2010
at 1-7.) Both doctors had their sworn testimony presented to the jury. Dr. Beaver appeared in
person. Dr. Katz appeared by having his trial deposition read to the jury.
On appeal for the first time, Appellant has identified other letters that he felt were
improperly excluded. These letters were also letters from doctors that either testified at trial or had
their trial depositions presented to the jury.
Appellant attempted to introduce these letters at different times during the trial.

In all

instances the district court's rulings were the same. The district court stated that the letters were
hearsay documents and that proper foundation had not been presented to allow them to be
introduced as evidence. The district court then cautioned Appellant's counsel that even if the proper
foundation was laid for the letters, the letters would be excluded if it was shown that the court's
pretrial order had been violated. In all instances, Appellant's counsel did not attempt to reintroduce
the letters or to provide proper foundation for the letters. Appellant's counsel did not even attempt
to argue that the letters were admissible hearsay. Where the medical provider testified at trial, the
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letters also contained cumulative evidence.
Appellant's arguments that the letters were improperly excluded do not even discuss the fact
that they were ruled inadmissible due to lack of foundation. Appellant is making arguments that
should have been made at trial following the proper foundation being laid for the submission of the
letters. The district comt did not even have to reach the issue of whether the exhibits should be
excluded as a sanction for violation of a pre-trial order.
Even had the court improperly excluded the letters, the error would be harmless. As stated,
all the doctors had their testimony introduced at trial. The letter from Dr. Katz was duplicative of
letters from other experts that were admitted. None of these leuers would have had any significant
impact on the jury as they were apparently convinced that Appellant had manipulated his medical
experts by withholding impmtant data from them.
b. The District Court Properly Allowed the Licensure Evidence and Television
Interview to be Presented to the Jury
The district court also properly ruled that evidence regarding the licensure revocation and
the television interview could be introduced for purposes of impeachment. This evidence may have
been a surprise to Appellant's counsel, but was clearly known to Appellant long before the trial.
The evidence was limited to impeachment based upon the statements made by Appellant and
Appellant's wife on the stand.
The evidence of the licensure revocation was brought in due to the statements of Appellant's
wife that Appellant could have made money as a licensed counselor, but abandoned that path to
counsel for free. The evidence of the forced license revocation showed that Appellant's wife's
statements were inaccurate and not credible.
The evidence of the licensure revocation was initially very limited and did not include
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introduction of the actual findings of the licensure board. R., p. 337. Appellant and his wife,
however, continued to testify regarding the specific details of the licensure revocation on direct and
re-direct examination.

Id.

This testimony opened the door for the introduction of additional

evidence regarding the specific findings of the licensing board. Id. This evidence showed that both
Appellant and his wife were not credible in their testimony regarding Appellant's reasons for not
being a licensed counselor.
Similarly, the television interview established that Appellant was not credible in several
aspects of his testimony. Almost the entire case ended up hinging upon the credibility of the
witnesses. The evidence presented was very relevant to the credibility of Appellant.
Appellant had testified that Appellant had problems with bright lights, movements,
concentration, memory and the ability to respond to questions and other physical and mental
problems.

(Objection to Plaintiff's Post Trial Motions, December 7, 2010 at 1-7.) Appellant

testified that he was still suffering from all these complaints. Id. Appellant's neuro-psychologist
testified that mental deficiencies could not be turned on and off. Id. The implication was that if
Appellant was suffering from these problems he would not be able to hide them.
The television interview showed that Appellant was not suffering from any of his claimed
mental deficiencies or his physical complaints. R., p. 336. The showing of the interview was
purely impeachment as it directly contradicted Appellant's testimony and presentation. The district
court did not abuse his discretion in allowing the interview to be played to the jury.
Appellant attempts to cast suspicion on the introduction of the interview by pointing to the
fact that the district court staff was unable to play the interview from a DVD version that was
labeled as an exhibit. The DVD was never offered for admission as an exhibit. It is not surprising,

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 25

therefore, that it was not admitted. The interview was preserved as part of the transcript record at
trial as it was played for the jury. If the Appellant had provided a trial transcript, the interview
would be a part of the transcript.
Evidently, the interview in the DVD form can only be played from the internet.· If the Court
would like to view the video, Respondent can provide the information necessary to view the
interview from the internet. It is not uncommon trial practice to have some evidence shown to the
jury as demonstrative or impeachment evidence, but not have the evidence admitted as an exhibit.
Two of Appellant's doctors were shown by video deposition, but the videos themselves were not
admitted as exhibits. This did not prevent the jury from considering as evidence the testimony they
heard.
Appellant claims that the jury may have been inflamed by the content of the interview.
Again, this allegation is completely unsupported as Appellant has failed to provide a trial transcript
by which this Court could review the statements made in the interview. Respondent's position,
along with the district court (R., p. 337) is that the interview contained what would normally be
considered positive comments about the Appellant. The views expressed about homosexuality were
very brief and were not inflammatory. Any improper prejudice that may have occurred by the
introduction of this evidence was substantially outweighed by the probative value.
The district court made the proper evidentiary rulings at trial and Appellant has utterly failed
to show that the district manifestly abused its discretion. This Court should affirm the district
court's evidentiary rulings.

4. Appellant Should not Get an Additur
As stated above, the district court's determination denying Appellant an additur is the same
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analysis as a motion for new trial. As shown above, the jury's verdict is supported by the clear
weight of the evidence. No additur is necessary as justice has been served. This Court should
affirm the district court's denial of Appellant's motion for an additur.
D)

RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL
As stated above, Appellant failed to provide the trial transcript on appeal.

Despite

knowingly foregoing a trial transcript, Appellant has pursued the appeal. As shown, without a trial
transcript, Appellant has no foundation for his appeal. Appellant is clearly hoping that by pursuing
the appeal without a transcript, this Court will be motivated to reconsider and grant Appellant's
motion to waive the cost of obtaining the trial transcript. This is an improper purpose for pursuing
an appeal that has not foundation.
The award of attorney fees is proper under IAR 41 and LC. § 12-121. This Court has
awarded attorney fees in a number of cases where the appeal was pursued without foundation. The
Supreme Court has held that an award of attorney fees is appropriate where, "this Court is left with
an abiding belief that the appeal has been brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without
foundation." Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561,571, 97 P.3d 428,438 (2004); citing: Minich v. Gem
State Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 911, 591 P.2d 1078 (1979); Sinclair & Co., Inc. v. Gurule, 114,

Idaho 362, 757 P.2d 225 (Ct.App. 1988).
The Karlson case is particularly instructive as this Court awarded attorney fees by finding:
The Karlsons' arguments on appeal are without foundation. Their challenge to the
Mowers' expert witnesses calls into question the district court's exercise of discretion on an
evidentiary ruling. There was no abuse of that discretion. Similarly, there is no substantial
basis shown to conclude that the district court erred in denying their post-trial motions for
J.N.O.V. or for a new trial. The Karlson's have failed to establish that any issue regarding
the district court's alleged failure to take judicial notice was timely and properly raised. The
Karlsons appeal is an invitation for this Court to re-litigate and second-guess the
proceedings below, including the jury's verdict and the district court's discretionary rulings.
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The appeal is unreasonable and without foundation.
Karlson, 140 Idaho at 571, 97 P.3d at 438. The Supreme Court in this present case could make

almost the identical statement regarding the present case. Only in the Karlson case the Appellant
had at least supplied the trial transcript for the Court's benefit. In this case Appellant has supplied
no trial transcript on appeal. The Appellant is essentially asking this Court to re-litigate the case
based upon Appellant's memory and interpretation of the evidence that was presented at trial.
Appellant's appeal is without foundation and is thereby frivolous.

This Court should deny the

appeal and award Respondent attorney fees and costs.

III. CONCLUSION
Based upon the evidence and information before this Court, this Court should: (1) affirm its
denial of Appellant's motion for waiver of costs; (2) dismiss the appeal based upon Appellant's
failure to provide the necessary trial transcript; (3) affirm the district court's post trial and
evidentiary rulings and affirm the jury verdict; and (4) award Respondent attorney fees and costs.

DATED this 28 th day of October 2011.
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES
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